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Abstract 
This article examines the new tests proposed for effective participation at trial and 
ability to plead guilty set out in the recently published Law Commission Report.1 The 
two new tests aim to replace the current criteria on unfitness to plead developed in M 
(John)2 and originating from Pritchard.3 While the tests are a welcome development 
in a set of scrupulously drafted proposals, particular focus will be given to the 
absence of a diagnostic threshold. 
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Introduction 
The Final Report of the Law Commission on Unfitness to Plead, published in 
January 2016,4 contains a draft Bill5 with proposals for two new tests aimed at 
replacing the current test for unfitness to plead. In the first instance, a test for 
capacity to participate effectively in a trial is proposed.6 Where a defendant is found 
to lack such capacity to be an effective participant in a trial, an additional test for 
capacity to plead guilty is introduced,7 allowing defendants who are unable to 
withstand the rigours of a trial but who wish nevertheless to enter a guilty plea to be 
                                                          
* Teesside University. The author wishes to thank Dr Anne Lodge for her insightful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
1 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), (‘the Report’). 
2 [2003] EWCA Crim 3452. Discussed by the Law Commission at para. 2.52-2.59. 
3 (1836) 7 C & P 303. 
4 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016). 
5 Criminal Procedure (Lack of Capacity) Bill, LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report - Volume 2: 
Draft Legislation, 10. 
6 Clause 1. 
7 Clause 5. 
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able to do so. Further welcome proposals are made in relation to the trial of facts,8 
which aim to extend the tests to cover the Magistrates and Youth Courts,9 and in 
relation to the use of intermediaries10 with the aim that as many defendants as 
possible should have access to a fair trial. Loughnan has commented that ‘[t]he 
hallmark of the Commission’s Report is balance.’11 This approach is evident 
throughout,12 the Law Commission’s aim most succinctly expressed as being ‘to 
balance the rights of the vulnerable defendant who cannot fairly be tried with the 
interests of those affected by the alleged offence and the need to protect the 
public.’13 Not all commentators share this view, however, Padfield questioning 
whether ‘the "rights" of those who are so vulnerable that they cannot be fairly tried 
should be balanced with the "interests" of others.’14 Nevertheless, such competing 
interests do need to be addressed and it is apparent that a balance is largely 
achieved. This article will focus on the proposals for the new tests; in particular, 
commentary will be made on the absence of a diagnostic threshold linking the test to 
a recognised medical condition, as is the norm with mental condition or capacity 
related defences. 
 
The proposed tests 
Initial responses to the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper favoured retention of 
the John M criteria,15 alongside an additional criterion relating to a defendant’s 
                                                          
8 Clause 9, described as the alternative finding procedure, under which all elements of the crime must 
be shown. 
9 Clauses 29-52. 
10 Clause 61. 
11 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 452. 
12 See e.g. para.5.3; para.9.70. 
13 Para.1.1. 
14Padfield, "Prosecuting" those who are unfit to be prosecuted? (Editorial) [2016] Crim LR, 227-228, 
227.  
15 M (John) [2003] EWCA Crim 3452. 
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decision-making capacity.16 Under the current law, a defendant must show an 
inability in respect of one of 6 ways:  
(1) understanding the charges;  
(2) deciding whether to plead guilty or not;  
(3) exercising his right to challenge jurors;  
(4) instructing solicitors and counsel;  
(5) following the course of proceedings;  
(6) giving evidence in his own defence.17  
The John M criteria address cognitive capacity, i.e. an ability to understand the trial 
process. The focus on a defendant’s cognitive ability, or foundational competence,18 
was criticised by the Law Commission, which suggested that there has been too 
much of an emphasis on cognitive criteria, and not enough on decision-making 
ability.19 Decision-making ability addresses an individual’s functional capacity, i.e. the 
ability to make decisions and take part in a trial. The proposed test contained with 
the draft Bill is a combination of the two tests,20 resulting in the following: 
Clause 3(2) A defendant is to be regarded as lacking the capacity to 
participate effectively in a trial if the defendant’s relevant abilities are not, 
taken together, sufficient to enable the defendant to participate effectively in 
the proceedings on the offence or offences charged. 
This clause requires that the defendant’s capacity will be assessed specifically in 
relation to the trial. Presumably the more complex the trial, the higher level of 
capacity needed. This reflects the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which assesses 
                                                          
16 Law Commission, Unfitness to Plead – Analysis of Responses (2013), paras.1.15-1.31. 
17 M (John) [2003] EWCA Crim 3452, [20]. 
18 See Law Commission, Unfitness to Plead – an Issues Paper, (2014), (‘Issues Paper’) para. 2.23. 
19 Issues Paper, para.2.6. 
20 Issues Paper, 2.28-2.30.  
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capacity of a patient to make specific decisions, rather than decision-making 
capacity generally.21 In Marcantonio and Chitolie22 the court approved of the need to 
make an assessment of D’s capacity context specific, stating that  
‘[a]n assessment of whether a defendant has the capacity to participate 
effectively in legal proceedings should require the court to have regard to 
what that legal process will involve and what demands it will make on the 
defendant. It should be addressed not in the abstract but in the context of the 
particular case.’23  
The draft Bill goes on to include a non-exhaustive list of relevant abilities,24 namely: 
(a) an ability to understand the nature of the charge; 
(b) an ability to understand the evidence adduced as evidence of the 
commission of the offence; 
(c) an ability to understand the trial process and the consequences of being 
convicted; 
(d) an ability to give instructions to a legal representative; 
(e) an ability to make a decision about whether to plead guilty or not guilty; 
(f) an ability to make a decision about whether to give evidence; 
(g) an ability to make other decisions that might need to be made by the 
defendant in connection with the trial; 
(h) an ability to follow the proceedings in court on the offence; 
(i) an ability to give evidence; 
                                                          
21 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 457. 
22 [2016] EWCA Crim 14. 
23 [2016] EWCA Crim 14, [7]. 
24 Clause 3(4). 
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(j) any other ability that appears to the court to be relevant in the particular 
case. 
Foundational competence, alongside the additional element of decision-making 
capacity makes for a more explicit test. While the current John M criteria could be 
claimed to set the bar too high, a test of decision-making capacity, on its own, has 
been said to set the bar too low.25 Thus, a combination of the two tests is a welcome 
development, offering a wide discretion to the court to test both capacity and context.   
 
Clause 6 of the draft Bill sets out the circumstances under which a defendant who 
lacks capacity to effectively participate in a trial may plead guilty to a charge: D’s 
relevant abilities, must be, taken together, sufficient to enable D to effectively 
participate in ‘(a) the hearing in which D pleads guilty… and (b) any subsequent 
proceedings on the offence or offences in question.’26 An additional non-exhaustive 
list is provided of relevant abilities, again representing a combination of foundational 
and functional capacity. In Marcantonio and Chitolie27 Lloyd Jones LJ expressed 
support for a two part test which allows D to enter a guilty plea: ‘[t]here will be cases 
in which the defendant would be unable to follow proceedings at trial or to give 
evidence but would not lack the decisional capacity necessary for entering a plea of 
guilty.’28 These views echo those of the Law Commission that preventing defendants 
from entering a guilty plea on the basis of their lack of capacity to participate in a 
‘hypothetical trial, seems unjustifiably to undermine their legal autonomy.’29 
 
                                                          
25 Issues Paper, para.2.25. 
26 Clause 6(2). 
27 [2016] EWCA Crim 14. 
28 [2016] EWCA Crim 14, [8]. 
29 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.150. 
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The proposals set out in the draft Bill set the threshold ‘neither too high nor too low’30 
and should increase the number of vulnerable defendants who are able to use the 
test which ‘captures the normative heart of the law of unfitness’.31 These proposals 
for the new tests are welcome, carefully thought-out and a substantial improvement 
on the current test for unfitness to plead. The main flaw in these proposals, it is 
submitted, is the omission to include a diagnostic threshold. 
 
The diagnostic threshold  
Notable within the new proposals is the omission of any need for a link to a 
recognised medical condition. This omission will not exclude the use of medical 
expertise entirely. In evidential terms, under clause 2(1): 
The court may not determine that a defendant lacks capacity to participate 
effectively in a trial except on the written or oral evidence of two or more 
persons: (a) one of whom must be a duly approved registered medical 
practitioner, and (b) one of whom must be a qualified person32 or a second 
duly approved registered medical practitioner.  
Much has been written about the role of medical experts in legal decisions33 and, 
clearly, there is a necessary role for medical experts as fact finders. This does not 
have to mean, however, that there should be no diagnostic threshold contained 
                                                          
30 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 457. 
31 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 456. 
32 Clause 2(6) In this section “qualified person” means— 
(a) a registered medical practitioner, 
(b) a registered psychologist, or 
(c) a person who has a qualification specified by the Secretary of State by 
Regulations. 
33 See e.g. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (1984), 227; Fulford, ‘Value, 
Action, Mental Illness, and the Law’, in Action and Value in the Criminal Law, Eds. Shute, Gardner 
and Horder, (1993), 300-310, 305; Morse, ‘Excusing the Crazy the Insanity Defense Reconsidered’, 
[1985] Southern California LR 779, 821. 
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within the substantive law; the reasons for this will be discussed below, following 
consideration of the presence of a diagnostic threshold in other areas of law, and an 
examination of the reasons why the Law Commission has chosen to exclude such a 
threshold. 
 
A link to a diagnostic threshold, although absent in the current test of unfitness to 
plead, features in many other areas, both criminal and civil, and in other jurisdictions. 
The much criticised insanity defence contains a causal link to a ‘disease of the 
mind’.34  Current reform proposals would convert this to a ‘recognised medical 
condition’.35 In order to satisfy either of these defences, a defendant would have to 
not only fulfil the criteria within them, but also to have been suffering from either a 
disease of the mind or recognised medical condition. Similarly, the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility requires a defendant to have been suffering from an 
abnormality of mental functioning which arose from a recognised medical condition.36 
In civil law, the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which deals with a person’s decision-
making ability, and on which the Law Commission based its original proposals for 
reform,37 requires an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind 
or brain.38  
 
The diagnostic threshold is present in other jurisdictions in relation to fitness to 
plead. In Scotland, a person is unfit for trial if he is incapable, by reason of a mental 
                                                          
34 M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200. It is conceded here that the term ’disease of the mind’ may have 
caused more problems than it has solved. It does, however, represent recognition of the need for a 
causal link between the condition from which D was suffering and the criteria for the defence. 
35 Law Commission Discussion Paper, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism, 2013, paras 86-
114. 
36 S2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by s52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
37 LCCP No.197: Unfitness to Plead (2010), para.3.13. 
38 Section 2(1) Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
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or physical condition, of participating effectively in a trial.39 In Jersey, the test 
introduced in the case of O’Driscoll40 requires a link to an unsoundness of mind, 
while in New Zealand D’s unfitness to stand trial must be linked to mental 
impairment.41 Consequently, it is not unthinkable to have a diagnostic threshold for 
other mental disorder defences and even for unfitness to plead in other jurisdictions, 
nor is it uncommon. If a diagnostic threshold is required for the Mental Capacity Act 
and the mental condition defences, then compelling reasons should exist as to why it 
should not be required for unfitness. The reasons provided by the Law Commission 
in this regard will be discussed below. 
 
Advantages of excluding diagnostic threshold 
The Law Commission remains ‘squarely of the view that [a diagnostic threshold] 
should not be a determinative requirement’.42 Primarily, the diagnostic threshold has 
been omitted on the grounds that the LC is not convinced that a threshold could not 
be ‘sufficiently wide to encompass all likely reasons for participation difficulties.’43 
There may be conditions that escape definition, and therefore limit the availability of 
the test. As Loughnan comments, a diagnostic threshold would be unlikely ‘to 
guarantee that the threshold for unfitness be set at an appropriate level.’44 In its 
Issues Paper, the Law Commission stated that ‘we doubt whether imposing a 
diagnostic threshold is likely to assist in maintaining a suitable threshold…’.45 In 
                                                          
39 S53F Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as amended by s170(1) Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. 
40 [2003] JRC 117 at [29]. 
41 Section 4 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003.  
42 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016). 
43 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.127(1). 
44 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 459. 
45 Law Commission, Unfitness to Plead: An Issues Paper, May 2014, para.2.40. 
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other words, if a diagnostic threshold is capable of suitable definition, it will make no 
difference to the test.  
 
The Law Commission does not consider that diagnoses of vulnerable defendants will 
be prevented; they can still form part of any assessments as to D’s lack of capacity 
and may remain a ‘helpful guide’ for determining malingerers or predicting 
recovery.46 Given their continued role in providing evidence under clause 2(1), this 
may well be the case. Loughnan also sees that the role of expert medical 
professionals will not be reduced.47 Additionally, according to the Law Commission, it 
will be possible to address future detention without being dependent on a 
diagnosis.48 The more nuanced test should allow for greater discretion in ‘guarding 
against individuals being found to lack capacity on the basis of profound political or 
religious views.’49 
 
A further reason for the Law Commission omitting a link to a diagnostic threshold is 
that the link is not required under the current test.50 It is evident that the outdated 
current test has survived without a diagnostic threshold. It is further conceded that, in 
practice, a diagnostic threshold may make very little difference to the availability of 
the test and, in fact, creates more obstacles for a vulnerable defendant. There are, 
however, principled reasons as to why the link to a diagnostic threshold should not 
be ruled out in future legislation. 
 
                                                          
46 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.127(2). 
47 Loughnan, ‘Between Fairness and “Dangerousness”: Reforming the Law on Unfitness to Plead’ 
[2016] Crim LR 451, 459. 
48 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.127(3). 
49 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.127(4). 
50 LAW COM No 364 Unfitness to Plead Report (2016), para.3.127(5). 
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Advantages of including a diagnostic threshold 
In addressing the arguments presented above, it is worth reviewing the underlying 
rationale behind the test of unfitness to plead. The rationale, primarily, is that every 
individual is entitled to a fair trial, a right enshrined within the European Convention 
on Human Rights,51 and dating back as far as clause 29 of the Magna Carta.52 
 
A person who is unfit to plead may be unable to have a fair trial for a number of 
reasons, for example, he may be unable to instruct counsel, present his own version 
of events, challenge evidence, follow the proceedings, or make decisions as to how 
his defence should proceed. If D is unable to do these things, a trial of such a 
vulnerable defendant becomes one-sided and may comprise largely of guesswork on 
the part of the defence.53 
 
In order for a trial to be fair, a defendant must, inter alia, be able to respond to 
charges made against him.54 The ability to respond implies that the fit defendant is 
taking part in a moral conversation with the court; an allegation of wrongful conduct 
is made against him and he may admit or refute this allegation. Given that a trial 
represents a moral conversation, it is not a huge step to assert that D must be a 
moral agent, i.e. have sufficient moral understanding, in order to take part in this 
conversation. This moral agency should be present not only at a time of committing 
the act, but also at the time he stands trial.  
                                                          
51 Article 6. 
52 1215. 
53 Howard, ‘Unfitness to plead and the vulnerable defendant: an examination of the Law 
Commission's proposals for a new capacity test’ (2011) J. Crim. Law 194, 196. 
54 R. A. Duff, ‘Fitness to Plead and Fair Trials: (1) A Challenge’ [1994] Crim LR 419 at 420-1. 
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Moral agency, according to the leading theory on culpability, requires that D has 
capacity and fair opportunity to make choices.55 A vulnerable defendant may not be 
a moral agent due to a lack of a lack of capacity. It is submitted here that such a lack 
of capacity should be linked to a recognised medical condition. This is because 
depriving D of moral agency is not a decision to be taken lightly, especially since D 
will be deprived of his fundamental right to a fair trial. If we are to deprive an 
individual of moral agency, then we must be sure of our reasons for doing so; the link 
to a recognised medical condition would provide support for those reasons and 
would provide for consistency and predictability across the mental condition 
defences. The term ‘recognised medical condition’, broader than ‘mental disorder,’ is 
advocated by the Law Commission in its Discussion Paper on Insanity and 
Automatism.56 As the term is also used for diminished responsibility,57 then 
consistency in the law could be possible here. Such a term could be sufficiently wide. 
Given that DSM 5 and ICD 1058 are increasingly inclusive,59 all of the examples 
originally provided in the Consultation Paper appear to fall within a recognised 
medical condition.60 Furthermore, it could be the case that the conditions listed within 
these diagnostic tools support the role of expert witnesses and assist in justifying 
                                                          
55 Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism – A Discussion Paper (2013), A.18. 
56 Law Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism – A Discussion Paper (2013), para. 
1.87. 
57 S52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
58 International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-
10) Version for 2010. 
59 Boysen, ‘Revision of the DSM and Conceptual Expansion of Mental Illness: An Exploratory Analysis 
of Diagnostic Criteria’ (2011) Journal of Mind and Behavior, 295-316. 
60 LCCP, Example 3A (para. 3.15)  (F70 Mild mental retardation); Example 3B (para. 3.16) (F32 Major 
depressive disorder, single episode); Example 3C (para. 3.17) (F90 Attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder); Example 3D (para. 3.18) (F20.0 Paranoid schizophrenia);  Example 3E (para. 3.19) 
(F42 Obsessive-compulsive disorder); Example 3F (para. 3.20) (F84.0 Autistic disorder); Example 3G 
(para. 3.43) (F70 Mild mental retardation). 
Learning disorders are also listed within ICD 10: F80-89, although the term ‘mental disorder’ should 
be rejected in favour of a more general ‘recognised medical condition’. Similarly 
speech/communication difficulties come within this classification – F80). 
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future detention. It is hoped that the nuanced test will be sufficient to address and 
exclude from its ambit those with political or extreme views, however this is more 
likely to be the case where a link is required to a recognised medical condition. The 
fact that there has been no link under the old, outdated test should not prevent a 
more principled approach to a modern test. 
 
Crucially, perhaps the biggest obstacle to the inclusion of a diagnostic threshold is 
that developmental/emotional immaturity is not a recognised medical condition under 
DSM 561 or ICD 10.62 If a link to a recognised medical condition were to be required, 
then the developmentally immature 10 year old could fail to satisfy the test, unless 
that immaturity can be linked, for example, to conditions on the autism spectrum or 
due to mild mental retardation. During the consultation process, the Law 
Commission has expressed its concern over the lack of a doli incapax defence.63 
Given the fact that the age of criminal responsibility stands at 10, and is one of the 
lowest in Europe, this is clearly a matter for concern.64 If, and until, such reform is 
forthcoming, perhaps the new Bill will be the best solution for the developmentally 
immature child to be found unfit to plead. Certainly the Law Commission identifies a 
need to screen the capacity of children over the age of 14, appearing for the first 
time in the Youth Court.65 The exclusion of a diagnostic threshold need not be the 
only means of achieving this outcome. One option could be to add developmental 
immaturity as a separate condition to be taken into account when applying the test in 
                                                          
61 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) (2013). 
62 International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-
10) Version for 2010. 
63 Issues Paper, para. 8.41. 
64 The age of criminal responsibility is set at 14 in Austria, Germany and Italy; 15 in Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark; 16 in Spain and Portugal; 18 in Belgium and Luxembourg. Howard & Bowen, 
‘Unfitness to plead and the overlap with doli incapax: an examination of the Law Commission's 
proposals for a new capacity test’ (2011) J. Crim. Law 380, 390. 
65 Report, para. 7.130. 
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the Youth Courts. In an earlier consultation paper, the Law Commission has 
proposed a separate limb of diminished responsibility, recognising the 
developmental immaturity of children below the age of 18.66 Although this was not 
adopted by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the idea of a separate clause which 
links to developmental immaturity is not new. Until we have a more responsive 
defence of doli incapax we still need to be vigilant to the needs of children within the 
criminal justice system. 
 
Conclusion 
A diagnostic threshold is not a new concept, whether in the mental condition 
defences, the civil law or other jurisdictions. Having a consistent diagnostic threshold 
within diminished responsibility, a reformed insanity defence and a test for lack of 
capacity could promote greater certainty within the law in these areas. If a 
recognised medical condition is required for the Mental Capacity Act and the mental 
condition defences, then we need compelling reasons as to why we should not, at 
least for the sake of consistency, require it for a reformed test of unfitness to plead. 
Conversely, if a diagnostic threshold is not needed for unfitness, then ought we to 
reconsider why it is required for insanity and diminished responsibility?  
 
In the absence of a diagnostic threshold, there could be a danger that the test for 
lack of capacity will be set too low, although it is conceded that this is unlikely, given 
the proposed evidential requirement of medical expertise. It is further acknowledged, 
and indeed hoped, that this absence remains a relatively minor ‘academic’ issue in a 
set of welcome, logical and prudently drafted proposals. Nevertheless, the place of 
                                                          
66 LCCP 304, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, 2006, para. 5.112. 
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academia is to raise such issues, and to provoke further debate: depriving a 
defendant of the most fundamental right to stand trial is a decision which ought to be 
robustly defensible, and it is the author’s view that this can best be achieved by 
requiring a link to a recognised medical condition.  
